
Two broad approaches compete: activism and restraint.
Every constitution needs a guardian. Judicial review assigns that role to the courts. How boldly courts play it remains fiercely debated.
The doctrine was born in Washington in 1803. Outgoing President John Adams named William Marbury a magistrate. Secretary of State James Madison withheld the commission. Marbury went straight to the Supreme Court for a writ. Chief Justice John Marshall saw a larger question lurking.
Marshall ruled that Marbury deserved his commission. Yet the statute granting the Court jurisdiction was void. Congress cannot enlarge powers the Constitution fixed. Saying what the law is, he wrote, belongs to courts.
Judicial review crossed the Pacific with American rule. It found its Filipino voice in 1936. The case was Angara v. Electoral Commission.
Jose Angara won a seat in the National Assembly. Pedro Ynsua filed a protest before the Electoral Commission. The Assembly had earlier confirmed Angara’s election by resolution. Angara argued the protest came too late. He asked the Supreme Court to stop the Commission.
Justice Jose P. Laurel wrote for the Court. The Commission, he held, acted within its constitutional sphere. More enduring was his defense of judicial review itself. Courts allocating constitutional boundaries assert no superiority over coequal branches.
Then came martial law. Courts often invoked the political question doctrine. Critics said this left executive acts largely unreviewed.
The 1987 framers responded by widening judicial power. Article VIII, Section 1 now defines that power broadly. Courts must settle actual controversies involving enforceable rights. They also check grave abuse of discretion in government. Chief Justice Roberto Concepcion championed this expanded power.
Scholars call it expanded certiorari jurisdiction. The political question doctrine narrowed considerably. Section 5 grants final say over constitutional challenges. Such cases must be decided by the Court en banc.
This power still has limits. Courts do not roam freely seeking laws to strike. Four requisites must first be met.
First, there must be an actual case or controversy. Second, the petitioner must have legal standing. This means a personal and substantial interest in the outcome. Third, the question must be raised at the earliest opportunity. Fourth, constitutionality must be the case’s very lis mota.
Lis mota means the heart of the dispute. Courts avoid constitutional questions when other grounds suffice. Standing is sometimes relaxed for transcendental importance. Taxpayers and legislators have sued under this exception.
Meeting the requisites opens the door. How far the Court walks through depends on philosophy. Two broad approaches compete: activism and restraint.
Judicial activism favors robust intervention to protect constitutional values. Activist courts read their powers generously. They relax standing and reach novel questions. Supporters say this shields rights from majoritarian excess. Critics warn it lets unelected judges make policy.
Judicial restraint counsels deference to the political branches. Restrained courts strike down acts only when violations are clear. Supporters say this respects democracy and separation of powers. Critics warn it can leave constitutional wrongs unremedied.
Philippine jurisprudence shows both tendencies. The expanded definition invites more intervention. Yet the Court often reaffirms deference to coequal branches.
Now apply these principles to impeachment. Article XI, Section 3(6) sets the threshold for conviction. Two-thirds of all Senate members must concur. With 24 senators, that means 16 votes. Questions arise when senators are absent, or when they abstain or inhibit.
Suppose a conviction rests on fewer than 16 votes. Or suppose the Senate counts only members present as it now has decided.
The Senate holds sole power to try impeachments. Francisco v. House of Representatives still permits some review. There, in 2003, the Court enforced constitutional limits on impeachment. In 2025 and 2026, in the first impeachment complaint against Sara Duterte, the Supreme Court also intervened to interpret the one year bar rule.
An activist Court would likely take the case. It would read “all the Members” as unambiguous. Counting votes, it might say, needs no political judgment. A shortfall would then be grave abuse of discretion. The conviction could then be annulled.
A restrained Court would proceed more cautiously. It might stress the Senate’s sole power to try. It could defer to the Senate’s own vote-counting rules. It might find the question political and nonjusticiable.
Both camps would likely agree on one point. The Court would not reweigh the evidence. Guilt or innocence remains the Senate’s call.
For me, it is not the lowering of the threshold that is the precedent here. The precedent is that the Senate (and the House for similar situations) can determine what the threshold for conviction is, and for that matter, charter change. In other words, it can choose to return to the higher bar or lower it further as it pleases.
In that context, will this survive judicial scrutiny or is this the kind of arbitrariness or grave abuse of discretion that is indicated in Article 8, Section 1, paragraph 2, as subject of judicial review? I suspect this might be the line of attack in a Supreme Court petition questioning this ruling.
Indeed, judicial activism and judicial restraint each carry real risks. The public is well served by understanding both. The Supreme Court should be wise enough to make the right choice for the country.
Originally published in Manila Standard on September 25, 2026
